In Kenneth Goodpaster’s essay called “On Being Morally Considerable” the author asks multiple interesting questions. Perhaps the most important one is; what are the requirements for “having standing” in the moral sphere? The reason why he’s asking this question is simple. There has been a significant increase of concern about the environment. Therefore, it is important to be clear about the framework of moral consideration as well as the application of that framework. He also acknowledges the self-interested concern about which we talked about in the previous blog. To answer his initial question, he introduces four points that are necessary and must be kept clear. First, it is the idea of being an appropriate “bearer of rights”. Second distinction is that between what might be called a criterion of moral considerability and a criterion of moral significance. The third distinction turns on the difference between questions of intelligibility and questions of normative substance. Here, the author poses two interesting questions. What sorts of beings can (logically) be said to deserve moral consideration? What sorts of beings do, as a matter of “ethical fact” deserve moral consideration? Finally, he brings us to the last distinction. He believes that there is clearly a sense in which we are subject to thresholds of moral sensitivity just as we are subject to thresholds of cognitive or perceptual sensitivity.
To sum up the essay, let’s go over Goodpaster’s main thoughts. The key question that he asks is; who has moral standing and what are the requirements/conditions of moral standing? He proposes that being alive is the condition of moral consideration. He tries to look into what other have proposed and see whether their ideas have worked or not. He finds out that all the other proposals for consideration (sentience, ect) miss the point that there is something more fundamental that should count. Sentience itself is an adaptive characteristic that provides an organism with a better ability to avoid threats in life.
After reading “On Being Morally Considerable” I left the reading with one very important, yet unanswered question. What sorts of beings do, as a matter of “ethical fact” deserve moral consideration?
If I would have to answer such question myself, I would say humans and animals. Again, it is difficult to think of it as a matter of ethical fact, because here the real question is, what is an really ethical fact? If we look at it from Goodpaster’s point of you, where moral agents play a significant role then yes, I would stay with my answer of humans and animals. Leopold Aldo however, would most likely consider the whole biotic community. It is certainly a tough question with many divided answers.
Question: What sorts of beings do, as a matter of “ethical fact” deserve moral consideration?
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Environmental Ethics 